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What does morality dictate with respect to U.S. immigration policy?
How strong is the case for making instrumental considerations, specifically
national economic self-interest, even more important in immigration
policymaking than such considerations are now? What would such a
policy look like? Which competing values would such a policy compromise
or undermine?
These are the main questions that I tackle in this Article. In doing so,
I present the two standard types of moral arguments: deontological and
instrumental-consequentialist. I devote the bulk of my analysis to the
latter, however, because I find that the former has comparatively little
power to resolve debates over immigration; deontological analysis does
not lead us in any particular policy direction. It may call our attention to
some of the competing values that immigration implicates, but it
provides little or no guidance as to what these values mean on the
contested ground of immigration policy debates, much less about how
we should trade them off against one another. To be sure, empirical
evidence about the actual consequences of our current and alternative
immigration regime have their own deep indeterminacies, which I shall
discuss in some detail below. But this evidence can at least enlighten us
about the terms of trade among the competing consequences and values
and can thereby help to narrow somewhat the remaining areas of dispute.
In Part I, I discuss five kinds of deontological arguments that a
moralist might advance in debating the ideal nature of our immigration
policy. In Part II, I take a more instrumentalist-consequentialist approach to
immigration policy analysis. Before doing so, however, I briefly note
some of the familiar methodological and cognitive limitations of
applying this approach to complex public policy issues of this kind,
limitations that remind us of the irreducible importance of normative
considerations and judgments to such policy assessments. I then go on
to identify the three main sets of empirical controversies that figure most
prominently in immigration debates, and summarize the empirical evidence
bearing on those controversies. In Part III, I contend that although national
economic growth is a highly imperfect measure of the instrumental value
of immigration, an immigration policy that is moral in the consequentialist
sense would nevertheless place greater weight on economic growth than
the current system does. In Part IV, I discuss some policy changes that
might move us in that direction.
I present all of this in a nontendentious spirit, reflecting my genuine
uncertainty and humility about how our society should assess and
address the rights and wrongs of these complex matters.
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I. MORALITY AND IMMIGRATION
There is something in us that likes to moralize about immigration, to
view it as an activity as to which strong normative views, including
feelings of right and wrong, not merely prudence or wisdom, are both
natural and appropriate. This moralizing impulse in public policy assessment
is hardly unique to immigration. Nor am I suggesting that moral
considerations actually dominate immigration policy outcomes. In fact,
the role of such arguments in any particular situation depends on many
factors.1 Instead, I simply mean that moral claims are inevitably a part,
and sometimes an important or even decisive part, of the lingua franca
of immigration debates. The clearest example, but certainly not the only
one, is the bitter division over the status and treatment of undocumented
immigrants, which I shall discuss below.2
Before developing the arguments, let me briefly define my terms.
A. Morality
What do I mean by morality? I define it, most simply, as a concern to
do the right thing, to be ethically scrupulous, to avoid doing wrong or
acting unjustly. I distinguish it from a concern merely to avoid doing a
misguided or harmful thing.
But what is the right thing that morality seeks to advance? Broadly
and conventionally speaking, there are two competing answers to this question:
deontology and consequentialism. Deontology defines moral conduct as
action that is right in itself, with rightness in turn being defined in terms
of certain antecedent and abstract principles or values—for example,
human dignity, equality, and flourishing. Consequentialism defines the
morality or rightness of a policy in terms of its actual, real-world effects—
for example, wealth creation or production of other forms of well-being.
There are, of course, as many different conceptions of rightness-initself as there are diverse people engaged self-consciously in deontological
moral reflection. Before proceeding, I wish to be clear that I am not a
moral philosopher or even particularly well-read in moral philosophy. I
recognize, moreover, that an immense professional literature exists that

1. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, The Politics of Rapid Legal Change: Immigration
Policy, 1980–1990, in CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP 91, 99–100, 133–38 (1998).
2. See generally JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION (Warren F. Schwartz ed., 1995).
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seeks to elucidate the relationship between deontology and consequentialism,
a literature with which I am not prepared to engage here.3 Fortunately,
my main points in this Article in no way depend on whether I am right
about the nature of this relationship.
That said, I believe that any deontological claim in the realm of
practical or applied ethics, the subject of this Article, must ultimately
devolve for its proof on some set of consequentialist claims.4 If the
content of what is right-in-itself is, say, some notion of human
flourishing, then in assessing a policy alternative in light of that norm, it
becomes necessary at some point to defend that alternative in
consequentialist terms by showing that certain conduct does, or does not,
in fact conduce to human flourishing, however defined. If one seeks to
justify a law permitting gay marriage, for example, as moral action on
deontological grounds because it instantiates the value of, say, dignity or
equality, then at some pivotal point in the argument one must show that
the law’s effects will in fact promote the dignity or equality of the
couple—perhaps by giving them as much pleasure or self-respect as
other couples receive from marriage. The deontological claim may
constrain the kinds of consequences that are relevant to its justification,
but once the claim is elaborated conceptually and normatively as deeply
as the analysis permits, the claim’s validity must ultimately rest on
propositions about its actual effects in the real world.5
3. See, e.g., DAVID CUMMISKEY, KANTIAN CONSEQUENTIALISM 3 (1996) (arguing
that Kant’s theories, despite their deontological trappings, are compatible with
consequentialism); SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 59–94 (1998) (describing
consequentialism and deontology); J. J. C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM:
FOR AND AGAINST (1973) (outlining and critiquing utilitarianism, a form of consequentialism);
cf. CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, Two Distinctions in Goodness, in CREATING THE
KINGDOM OF ENDS 249, 249 (1996) (describing “the distinction between intrinsic and
extrinsic goodness, and the distinction between ends or final goods, and means or
instrumental goods” and discussing the work of Ross, Moore, and Kant on this subject).
4. This, of course, is a controversial claim. Some deontologists might argue that
moral choices are based on universal rules whose value is defined without reference to
their consequences. In some cases, pursuing deontological ethics may even lead to
unnecessary harm or suffering. SMART, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST, supra note 3, at 3–5. Moreover, strict or absolute
deontologists would argue that there can be no deviation from these universal rules,
regardless of the outcome a given rule generates in a particular case. Kant’s Formula of
Humanity, for instance, posits that humanity is an end in itself and that “as an
unconditional end it must never be acted against. It is not one end among others, to be
weighed along with the rest.” KORSGAARD, Kant’s Formula of Humanity, in CREATING
THE KINGDOM OF ENDS, supra note 3, at 106, 125. More moderate deontologists,
however, maintain that one can be a deontologist without accepting deontological absolutism,
despite the critique that such a position ultimately devolves into consequentialism itself.
See KAGAN, supra note 3, at 80 (discussing the constraint against doing harm).
5. In a recent example, the U.S. Supreme Court divided sharply over whether
“dignity” was in fact promoted by denying a defendant who was mentally ill but
competent to stand trial the right to represent himself in court, or whether his dignity was
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By adopting a consequentialist approach, I emphatically do not dismiss
the importance of deontological approaches. Indeed, consequentialism
would be less attractive without an underlying, perhaps deontological,
conception of the good.6 Deontological approaches help us to decide
which ends we wish to pursue a priori. I do not, therefore, subscribe to
consequentialism monistically. I simply argue that as a descriptive matter,
consequentialism can shed much light on which among the competing
ends we should choose. As Shelly Kagan notes, “the goodness of an
act’s consequences is at least one morally relevant factor in determining
the moral status of that act,” but the goodness of consequences requires a
theory of the good to ground the comparison.7
Even if my logical or methodological assertion here could be
questioned, I still maintain that consequentialism is a more personally
congenial, and generally a more illuminating, way to analyze and assess
the morality of immigration policy. This is true, I believe, even when
one considers consequentialism’s characteristic limitations, as I shall do
below.
Nevertheless, the deontological-consequentialist distinction remains
useful here, so I do not want to collapse it entirely. My reason is that a
policy justification invoking anticipated consequences that will
predictably advance one’s own well-being, other than one’s interest in
acting morally, is importantly different from a justification that invokes
relatively disinterested reasons favoring the well-being of others in the
nation or some other morally-relevant community. When I speak of
moral argument in the immigration debate, then, I am referring to the
affirmed by protecting his right to do so. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387
(2008).
6. Strict consequentialism, for example, would hold that “goodness of outcomes
is the only morally relevant factor in determining the status of a given act.” KAGAN,
supra note 3, at 60. Among the critiques of this version of consequentialism is, as Kagan
points out, that “you can never be absolutely certain as to what all the consequences of
your act will be” and that it has no logical end point. Id. at 64. “If consequences are the
only things that matter for determining the moral status of an act, then doesn’t it follow
that the agent will have to be forever calculating the consequences of his acts?” Id. at
66; see also Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST, supra note 3, at 75, 82. Finally, this view of consequentialism does not
account for the morality of the individual actor because “all that matters is [sic] the
results—and not how they come about.” KAGAN, supra note 3, at 95; see also Bernard
Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST, supra
note 3, at 75, 99. However, the more modest consequentialist approach through which I
assess the morality of immigration policy avoids these criticisms.
7. KAGAN, supra note 3, at 60.
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latter. I do so, moreover, even though moral and non-moral arguments
are intertwined rhetorically in ways that may make them difficult to
distinguish analytically, and sometime empirically, in any particular case.
B. Immigration Policy Interests
Immigration policy involves numerous actors and interests other than
the immigrants themselves and their families: the local, regional, and
national communities in the states of origin;8 the communities in the
receiving states; the identity and ethos of these communities; the
immigrants’ competitors for jobs, space, social services, status goods,
and so forth.
The impacts on these groups are enormous at both the macro and
micro levels. Some of these impacts are beneficial, some are detrimental,
and some are both simultaneously. Judgments about benefit and detriment
depend, among other things, on the units of analysis that the analyst
employs and the distributive calculus for assessing those effects across
those units. The evidence strongly suggests, for example, that immigration
is, on balance, beneficial to the United States as a whole, yet makes
some individual Americans—and immigrants—worse off, particularly
at the lower socioeconomic levels. Because a serious consequentialist
analysis shows that immigration’s effects are vast, difficult to define,
and perhaps impossible to measure, such an analysis is inevitably
controversial and vulnerable to criticism, which further encourages
critics of any particular position to aggressively join the debate. And
when they do so, they are likely to employ moralistic arguments as
well as fact-invoking, consequentialist ones. Such critics will use these
moralistic arguments in order to exploit the empirical uncertainties
and to draw on the persuasive power of claims that seem more
disinterested and that appeal to our highest ideals and most elevated
self-conceptions.
C. Some Deontological Tropes
In immigration policy debates, this moralism manifests itself in a
number of familiar, and overlapping, rhetorical tropes or motifs. Call
them the (1) human rights, (2) historical continuity, (3) family unity,
(4) fairness, and (5) sovereignty themes.

8. See the contributions to CITIZENSHIP AND THOSE WHO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF
EMIGRATION AND EXPATRIATION (Nancy L. Green & François Weil eds., 2007); see also
Symposium, A Tribute to the Work of Kim Barry: The Construction of Citizenship in an
Emigration Context, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2006).
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1. Human Rights
Immigrants often have compelling claims based on human rights
principles grounded in noninstrumental notions of personal dignity and
social solidarity. This is most obvious with those who seek refugee status,
either as refugees overseas or as asylees at the border or in the U.S.
interior. In such cases, they are, by legal definition, claiming that they
have a well-founded fear of persecution in their country of origin based
on their race, religion, national origin, political opinion, or membership
in a particular social group.9 As noted below, however, the human rights
defense of immigration is not confined to those fleeing persecution; it
extends as well to close family members of the immigrant.
The rhetorical trope here is an exceedingly powerful one. The putative
refugee has already endured persecution, has no safe alternatives, and
through no fault of the refugee’s own, will suffer deprivations of life,
bodily security, or freedom if returned to the country of origin. Sometimes,
this moral claim is strengthened by a contention that U.S. foreign policy
has played a role in creating the persecutory environment—as, for
example, with the civil wars in Central America during the 1980s, or the
Iraq conflict today. In the latter case, the U.S. government’s failure to
process and approve more of the claims by endangered individuals who
worked with the occupying forces or whom we placed at grave risk for
our own policy purposes is particularly egregious and reprehensible, as
Congress and the administration have belatedly recognized—so far,
without much apparent effect on the number or speed of their processing
and protection.10
2. Historical Continuity
All Americans, with the possible exception of the Native Americans,
are immigrants or the descendants of immigrants. This obvious fact has
enormous affective, rhetorical, and political implications. Not only is
there a deep reservoir of public sympathy for immigrants—even extending
to those undocumented workers who are otherwise law abiding.
9. “Membership in a particular group” is an elastic category that has sometimes
been interpreted to include labor unions, draft-age youth in civil wars, Muslim women
who refuse to wear hijab, and so forth. See generally FORCED MIGRATION LAW AND
POLICY (David A. Martin et al. eds., 2007).
10. Conrad Mulcahy, Officers Battle Visa Hurdles for Iraq Aides, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 2008, at A1.
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Americans also insist that “we are a nation of immigrants” and proudly
self-identify as such. This phrase carries with it the power of cliché—
the reflexive, almost instinctual response to preserve those traditions and
ideals when they are challenged by those who seek to restrict immigration.
Because we have historically been receptive to immigrants and our
society has prospered, as the reasoning and rhetoric seem to go, we must
continue to do so.11
This strong defense of our immigration ethos is fortified, perhaps
paradoxically, by newer works of immigration history that provide
decidedly less uplifting narratives of immigration policy and immigrant
reception. Recent books by Rogers Smith, Mae Ngai, Aristide Zolberg,
and Daniel Kanstroom exemplify this revisionist genre.12 They suggest,
first, that our openness to immigration has been discontinuous—notably,
the forty-five year pause from 1921–1965 when the national origins
quotas prevailed13—and second, that hostility to immigrants was at least
as common a response as welcome.14 Yet these historical accounts, as
their authors no doubt intended, elicit deep shame and regret on the part
of U.S. policymaking elites and they reinforce a corresponding conviction
that we must not repeat these mistakes in the future. Indeed, because
few immigration restrictionists today will publicly defend the thoroughly
discredited system of national origins quotas,15 their call for a new pause
places them at an immense, morally grounded rhetorical disadvantage.
3. Family Unity
Family-based immigration utterly, and increasingly, dominates our
legal immigration system.16 This preference system gives a clear priority to
the close family members of U.S. citizens and of legal permanent residents.
11. See, e.g., ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN
THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA 453–59 (2006).
12. D ANIEL K ANSTROOM , D EPORTATION N ATION: O UTSIDERS IN A MERICAN
HISTORY 28–29 (2007); MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE
MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 17–19 (2004); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS:
CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 15–16 (1997); ZOLBERG, supra
note 11, at 243.
13. See, e.g., KANSTROOM, supra note 12, at 225; NGAI, supra note 12, at 3, 17;
SMITH, supra note 12, at 24, 337; ZOLBERG, supra note 11, at 243, 337. For a historical
account of the quota system emphasizing the role of advocates for more liberal,
inclusive, and nondiscriminatory versions of the system, see Son-Thierry Ly & Patrick
Weil, The Antiracist Origin of the Quota System (Nov. 8, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Patrick Weil, Yale University).
14. See, e.g., KANSTROOM, supra note 12, at 28–29; NGAI, supra note 12, at 19,
108; SMITH, supra note 12, at 15; ZOLBERG, supra note 11, at 16.
15. For a brief description of the system, see IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:
PROCESS AND POLICY 170–71 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff et al. eds., 6th ed. 2008).
16. To a far lesser extent, this is also true of our undocumented migration flows.
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In 2007, almost 66% of new permanent visas were granted on the basis
of family relationships, up from 63% in 2006 and 58% in 2005.17 This
contrasts with Australia, another immigration-receiving country, since
the 1970s, where 70% of the new permanent immigrants will be admitted
on the basis of their labor skills, not family ties.18 The institution of
birthright citizenship, which takes perhaps its more liberal form in the
United States, extending even to the U.S.-born children of undocumented
aliens, is similarly based on a concern, among other rationales, for family
integrity.19
From a moral point of view, this strong pro-family bias in our
immigration policy has both deontological and consequentialist support.
Virtually no one doubts that family stability and unity are values in and
of themselves, helping to constitute our sense of self and of the world.
But families also stand at the very heart of social life and individual
well-being. It is hardly surprising, then, that so many Americans think
that any policy that fails to advance these core values is morally and
socially unacceptable. For this reason, U.S. immigration policy has
extended immigration rights quite far—even to the spouses and children
of previously undocumented aliens who manage to gain legal status.
Indeed, immigration advocates often argue that family unification is not
merely a sound public policy but an international human right protected
by international conventions to which the United States is a party.20

17. KELLY JEFFERYS & RANDALL MONGER, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2007, ANNUAL FLOW
R EPORT 3 tbl.2 (2008), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/LPR_
FR_2007.pdf. In fact, the true percentages are significantly higher because many of
those who are admitted under other categories come as family members accompanying
the main visa holder.
18. Australia’s Skills Shortage: Give Us Your Huddled Masses, Mate, ECONOMIST,
May 31, 2008, at 47, 48.
19. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT
CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY ch. 4 (1985); PETER J. SPIRO,
BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION ch. 1 (2008).
20. See, e.g., Jacqueline Bhabha, The ‘Mere Fortuity of Birth’? Children, Mothers,
Borders, and the Meaning of Citizenship, in MIGRATIONS AND MOBILITIES: CITIZENSHIP,
BORDERS, AND GENDER (Seyla Benhabib & Judith Resnik eds., forthcoming 2009).
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4. Fairness
Many moralistic arguments in favor of immigration are premised on
some notion of fairness. All people, in Ronald Dworkin’s formulation
of this deontological view, have a right to equal concern and respect
simply by virtue of their humanity, a right that would be violated by any
immigration restriction that discriminates on the basis of race or some
other arbitrary characteristic.21 A related fairness-based argument rests
on the nondiscrimination principle. This principle, to which almost all
Americans claim to subscribe, likewise requires equal treatment of all
people who are subject to governmental power.22 Most other fairness
arguments derive more or less directly from such anti-exploitation and
nondiscrimination arguments.
Some of the arguments from fairness, however, begin with consequentialist
premises. They often invoke fairness considerations to support expansionist
immigration policies. One such argument, for example, emphasizes that
immigrants pay taxes, claim relatively few benefits, and increase the
wealth of our society and hence that fairness dictates—through a kind of
quid pro quo or anti-exploitation logic—that they be assured the
opportunity to participate in our social life.23 Pursuing this same logic to
what they view as its logical conclusion, some immigration proponents
contend that immigrants should have an equal right to receive all social
benefits and even the franchise.24
Not all fairness arguments, however, favor more immigration; some
militate against it. This is particularly true of those that emphasize our
greater responsibility to the most vulnerable of our own people. Usually
linked to a consequentialist claim that immigrants hold down the wages
of low-skill Americans, especially among vulnerable minorities, much of
this opposition points to the moral imperative of favoring the interests of
our families and our own people over the interests of strangers.25

21.
22.
23.

See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 179–82 (1977).
See id. at 272–73.
KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO
RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 119–30 (2007); SPIRO, supra note 19, at
16.
24. See, e.g., LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 37–76, 90–100 (2006); JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 87–
193; HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 198–200 (2006); SPIRO, supra note 19, at 16–17,
30–31.
25. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 119–30.
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5. Sovereignty
The cherished principle of national sovereignty has always generated a
number of restrictionist arguments based on, in Alexander Bickel’s
phrase, the morality of consent.26 This is the notion that a free and
autonomous subject—here, the nation—must be free to decide for itself
how to limit its own freedom by taking on responsibilities to others. The
nation, in this understanding, possesses the unlimited power to decide
whether, under what conditions, and with what effects it would consent
to enter into a relationship with a stranger.27 On this view, the fact that a
stranger is desperate to enter, and has invested a great deal in the effort,
is as immaterial as the reasons that prompt the government to refuse
admission to the stranger.28 This conception of sovereignty implies that the
nation may decide to accept as few or as many immigrants as it likes in
such categories and under such conditions as it wishes to impose.29
In recent decades, the United States has found its national sovereignty
increasingly constrained by a number of factors that are more or less
beyond its control: migratory movements, geopolitical changes, international
law regimes, globalization of the economy, the rise of competing national
powers, and so forth.30 Yet the American public has not yet accepted
this fact, much less all of its implications for immigration policy.
Indeed, politicians and the mass media often characterize immigration as an
alarming “flood” or “invasion,” implying a sudden breach in the wall
that surrounds the nation and protects its autonomy. This metaphor
helps to explain the demand for a physically impregnable, and legally
overriding, fence on the Mexican border.31 It manifests the ever-more
desperate assertion of national sovereignty even as our control has
grown steadily more incomplete and contestable.

26. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975).
27. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 6–7 (1984); see also STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 20
(1999).
28. Schuck, supra note 27, at 6.
29. An exception would be made for special obligations that the nation has
voluntarily undertaken, such as the Refugee Convention. See KRASNER, supra note 27,
at 20, 22.
30. See, e.g., FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POST-AMERICAN WORLD 4, 42, 44–45 (2008).
31. See Adam Liptak, Border Fence Project Can Void Any Law, But Challenges
Arise, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2008, at A1.

875

SCHUCK.PRINTER.DOC

11/25/2008 2:02:02 PM

II. CONSEQUENTIALIST ARGUMENTS
Reviewing the literature on public opinion concerning immigration as
of the late 1990s, I summarized the findings as follows:
Most Americans . . . are pragmatic restrictionists, although one cannot be certain.
That is, they favor lower levels of immigration but are open to argument and
evidence about what those levels should be and about what immigration’s actual
effects are. Thus their views about the wisdom and level of restriction are
capable of being changed. . . .
....
Some of the evidence of ambivalent or conflicting American attitudes toward
immigration may reflect this propensity to draw subtle but important
distinctions. According to the survey data, for example, Americans like
immigrants more than they like immigration, favor past immigration more than
recent immigration, prefer legal immigrants to illegal ones, prefer refugees to
other immigrants, support immigrants’ access to educational and health benefits
but not to welfare or Social Security, and feel that immigrants’ distinctive
cultures have contributed positively to American life and that diversity continues to
strengthen American society today. At the same time, they overwhelmingly
resist any conception of multiculturalism that discourages immigrants from
learning and using the English language.32

These sorts of considerations lend themselves to arguments based on
empirical evidence concerning the actual effects of immigration policies
on American society. Pragmatic people, of course, can be influenced by
both moral and functional arguments. My limited claim, based in part
on my experience and on the famously pragmatic character of American
culture, is that moral arguments tend to dissolve into functional ones.
Even so, it is important to recognize that consequentialist arguments
do not always, or perhaps even usually, resolve debates in areas as
controversial as immigration policy. Just as deontological argumentation
often leads us into a normative cul-de-sac, consequentialism suffers from
certain chronic analytical limitations that leave plenty of rhetorical space
for normative arguments. Because the nature of these limitations has been
fully explained in the extensive literature on rationalistic decisionmaking
methods, most notably cost-benefit analysis, I shall briefly note only
a few of them here.33

32. P ETER H. S CHUCK , C ITIZENS , S TRANGERS , AND I N -B ETWEENS : E SSAYS ON
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 8–9 (1998).
33. For a flavor of the contemporary debate, see FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA
HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF
NOTHING (2004); MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006); RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING
RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT
AND OUR HEALTH (2008); Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond CostBenefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433 (2008).
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First, the factual evidence needed to support a consequentialist claim
is often unavailable; even if available, it may be weak, indeterminate,
conflicting, or otherwise inconclusive.34 Moreover, a key question—
how best to interpret that evidence—may be eminently debatable. Part
of that interpretive debate will inevitably involve normative disagreements
of the following kinds: Which are the relevant consequences? How
should they be defined and understood? What values should be assigned
to these consequences? How much weight should they be accorded
relative to other values? How can they best be instantiated in policy?35
In addition, even relatively clear-cut empirical evidence will be
subject to a social-psychological process known as “cultural cognition,”
in which the individuals who apprehend this evidence tend to assimilate
it in ways designed to render it congruent with the particular pre-existing
cultural frames or paradigms that, for a variety of reasons, they already
happen to embrace.36 Finally, the consequentialist analyst must choose
which of particular consequences the analyst will consider. This is an
important choice because in practice, an analyst can only consider a
small proportion of the myriad effects that any significant public policy
engenders in the world.
Which kinds of consequentialist arguments are typically made in
debates over immigration? In my brief survey of these arguments, my
purpose is not to resolve them but rather to provide a flavor of how they
proceed—and also to suggest some of the interpretive and normative
issues that surround the empirical data. In order to make this task
manageable, I draw on a 1998 article in which I analyzed the arguments
advanced by prominent restrictionist Peter Brimelow in his provocative
book Alien Nation.37 Here, I have truncated that discussion to focus on

34. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 33, at 36–37.
35. How rigorously and consistently one answers these questions will determine
whether one is merely a “cafeteria consequentialist,” to use Michael Blake’s disparaging
term. Michael Blake, Comment at Institute for Law & Philosophy Conference: National
Borders and Immigration, University of San Diego School of Law (Apr. 25, 2008).
36. See, e.g., MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN
ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 80–82 (1982);
TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE: HOW LAWSUITS HELPED THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH CONFRONT CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE chs. 4–5 (2008) (discussing the
conceptual framing of issues); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and
Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2006).
37. SCHUCK, Alien Rumination: What Immigrants Have Wrought in America, in
CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS, supra note 1, at 326, 326–58 (reviewing
PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION
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three of the leading consequentialist arguments for restriction, based on
demography, economy, and cultural assimilation. Although different
restrictionists may make different arguments, I take Brimelow’s claims
to be fairly representative of the genre.38
A. Demography
Arguments about demography invariably begin with the numbers.
The number of legal admissions—over one million a year recently—is
very high by historical standards in absolute terms, but not as a
proportion of today’s much larger U.S. population.39 Estimates of the
number of unauthorized migrants who reside in the United States more
or less permanently tend to converge around 11–12 million in 2006, a
total that traditionally increased by roughly 250,000 each year.40 There
are indications that the unauthorized flow has recently diminished
somewhat in response to the economic crisis in the United States and
more vigorous border and interior enforcement.41 The proportion of the
population that is foreign-born is steadily rising toward the record level
of almost fifteen percent reached before World War I, but even that level
would remain well below that of many other countries such as Canada,
Switzerland, and Israel. Still, the fact that one in eight persons in the
United States is a first-generation immigrant gives immigration a much
higher profile today than it possessed in 1970 when fewer than one in
twenty were foreign-born.
In addition to arguments about which numbers are most revealing for
policy purposes, there are debates over the numerical trajectory and its
significance. Historically, the United States has not admitted steady
streams of immigrants. Instead, the pattern has been more punctuated—
occasional spurts followed by short-term pauses or longer lulls, resulting
from the convulsions of war and the business cycle and, between 1920

DISASTER (1995)). I shall also draw on another review of the empirical literature by
Christopher Jencks, Who Should Get In?, N.Y. REV., Nov. 29, 2001, at 57–63, and
Christopher Jencks, Who Should Get In? Part II, N.Y. REV., Dec. 20, 2001, at 94–102.
38. For a discussion of the different species of restrictionists, see SCHUCK, The
Immigration System Today, in CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS, supra note 1, at
3, 4–11.
39. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics:
2007, Table 1, http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/LPR07.shtm (last visited
Nov. 2, 2008).
40. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. (2006) (estimating 11.5–12 million as
of March 2006).
41. Miriam Jordan, Crossings by Migrants Slow as Job Picture Dims, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 9, 2008, at A1; Ginger Thompson, Fewer People Are Entering U.S. Illegally,
Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at A17.
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and 1965, from legislation restricting immigration.42 But far from being
wave-like, the post-1965 legal immigration flow has waxed but, shortterm fluctuations aside, never really waned. Until very recently, the
volume increased pretty much regardless of the business cycle.43 Even
now, amid what promises to be a deep recession, a large enduring decline
seems unlikely.
In light of this trajectory, some restrictionists have called for a new
pause, which might facilitate the successful assimilation of the more
recent arrivals, much as the pre-1920s cohort benefited from the
previous lull between 1920 and 1965.44 Such a pause might also ease
immigration-related social anxieties resulting from the constant addition
of newcomers. Social mobility theory, the historical pattern of assimilation,
and common sense lend plausibility to this notion.45 It is intriguing that
immigrants themselves—by a large majority—believe that immigration
should either be kept at present levels or reduced, and support for this
position increases with their time in the country. Whether immigrants possess
some special insight into how large-scale, continuing immigration retards
the assimilation of recent immigrants, or simply wish for selfish reasons
to pull up the ladder now that they have climbed aboard, is unclear.
Restrictionists also point to projections of population growth,
particularly from the Third World countries that have dominated the
post-1965 flow, and predict that these immigrants will bring new—and
in some cases, old—diseases, high rates of fertility and crime, and low
rates of education and skill.46 They will crowd out the rest of us, swamping
our classrooms, extending our slums, polluting our air, and destroying
our amenities and communities. On the other hand, straight-line extrapolations
in demographic matters seldom prove to be correct.47 Long-term demographic
projections necessarily assume that human choices are more fixed than
42. See ZOLBERG, supra note 11, at 461.
43. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics:
2007, Table 1, http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/LPR07.shtm (last visited
Nov. 2, 2008); Jordan, supra note 41, at A1; Thompson, supra note 41, at A17.
44. See, e.g., PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA’S
IMMIGRATION DISASTER 262 (1995).
45. Id. at 271.
46. STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, 100 MILLION MORE:
PROJECTING THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON THE U.S. POPULATION, 2007 TO 2060, at 1,
11–13 (2007), http://www.cis.org/articles/2007/back707.pdf.
47. NICHOLAS EBERSTADT, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
RESEARCH, GLOBAL DEMOGRAPHIC OUTLOOK TO 2025: RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
THE WORLD ECONOMY (2007), http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25454/pub_detail.asp.
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they actually are and that the future will therefore be much like the
recent past and present. In fact, immigrant fertility rates generally converge
with those of the native population by the second or third generation.48
The important questions, therefore, are how quickly this occurs and what
fertility levels are optimal in a society that must support a growing
cohort of longer-lived retirees.
Concerns about immigration-related overcrowding are also debatable.
The United States today remains a country with a relatively low population
density. This does not simply reflect the vast uninhabited—and at present
uninhabitable—spaces in the American West. Even America’s largest
and densest cities are thinly populated relative to other cities in the world,
including the most famously attractive ones.49 Indeed, the population
density of New York City is about half what it was a century ago; other
major cities are also less densely populated.50 We have a long way to go
before we reach density levels that other western democracies find perfectly
acceptable, even desirable. Our standards of acceptable density may be
different from those in Europe, but our standards are not immutable, as
the historical urbanization, suburbanization, and “edge city” cycles in
the United States attest.51
Demographic extrapolations are further confounded by the dynamics
of markets, politics, and other powerful social processes that respond to
developments that impose widespread social costs. These processes do
not sit idly by while change unfolds but instead shape and constrain change,
thereby altering its future trajectory. Demographic models cannot readily
incorporate this fact, which is nicely captured in “Stein’s Law”: If a trend
cannot go on forever, it will stop.52 Population growth, for example,
bids up the prices of housing, education, and other goods; people therefore
tend to have fewer children, other things being equal. If increased job
competition pushes unemployment high enough for long enough,
immigrants will tend not to migrate here. If competition for natural
resources and other environmental goods becomes more intense, those

48. See Tamara K. Hareven & John Modell, Family Patterns, in HARVARD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS 345, 348–49 (Stephan Thernstrom et al.
eds., 1980).
49. See Demographia, World Urban Population Density by Country & Area,
http://demographia.com/db-intlua-area2000.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2008); see also
SCHUCK, Alien Rumination: What Immigrants Have Wrought in America, in CITIZENS,
STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS, supra note 1, at 326, 336.
50. Schuck, Alien Rumination: What Immigrants Have Wrought in America, in
CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS, supra note 1, at 326, 336–37.
51. The term comes from JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER
(1988).
52. Herbert Stein, Herbert Stein’s Unfamiliar Quotations, SLATE, May 16, 1997,
http://www.slate.com/id/2561/.
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goods will become more costly, which both rations their use and attracts
additional supply; these behavioral responses in turn tend to reduce the
price. If policymakers perceive that population growth harms the
environment, the economy, and other areas of public concern, they will
propose policy changes accordingly. If our politics and markets are supple
and responsive enough to react swiftly and intelligently to population
pressures and other strains, the future need not unduly arouse our fears.
Indeed, since 1965, our social institutions have preformed reasonably
well in responding to new challenges, refuting the Chicken Littles of
environmental pessimism. Or so one may plausibly argue.
B. Economy
Brimelow, labor economists George Borjas and Vernon Briggs, and
other restrictionists argue that the post-1965 migration flow has
uncoupled legal immigration from the needs of the U.S. economy.53
This claim is actually a composite of four separate claims. The first is
that labor market skills play a small and shrinking role in admissions
policy. Second, the post-1965 cohort is less skilled than earlier cohorts.
Third and related, this cohort drains the economy more than earlier
cohorts because its members, especially illegal aliens, are more likely to
demand public assistance and displace native workers. Fourth, this
displacement imposes particularly heavy burdens on current and
potential black workers.
The first claim is correct, as noted earlier, and I discuss it further in
Part III. The second claim—that the quality of immigrants has declined
since the 1965 reforms—is much more difficult to assess. Good data on
immigrant labor markets are hard to come by, and analyses are very
sensitive to methodology. More to the point, labor economists disagree
about the nature and validity of some of Borjas’s data, methodology, and
conclusions.54 Methodological issues abound. One concerns the extent to
which the immigrant category should be disaggregated. Different
subcategories of immigrants—family-based admittees, skills-based admittees,
53. The claims in this paragraph are advanced in GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN’S
DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY chs. 4–5 (1999); VERNON M.
BRIGGS, JR., MASS IMMIGRATION AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: POLICY DIRECTIONS FOR
THE NEW CENTURY (3d ed. 2003); BRIMELOW, supra note 44, at 5.
54. For a popular account of the dispute between Borjas and economist David
Card, see Roger Lowenstein, The Immigration Equation, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 9, 2006,
at 36.
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refugees and asylees, age groups, source region or country groups, legals
versus illegals—in a given cohort exhibit quite different characteristics.
Lumping some or all of these subcategories together can significantly
affect the outcome of the analysis. Reliance on census data, which employ
rather crude, self-reported ethnic categories and do not include off-thebooks income, is also controversial.
These and other methodological issues make it difficult to resolve
authoritatively some of the most fundamental empirical, policy-relevant
questions: Do immigrants take jobs that low-skilled American workers
reject, and if so, why do they reject them? Is it because immigration has
severely depressed wages for these jobs, or because of some cultural
factor? To what extent is immigrant labor a complement to native labor,
enhancing the latter’s productivity, and to what extent is it a substitute,
displacing native labor? How large is the wage gap between various
subgroups of immigrant workers and native workers? To what extent is
this gap affected by the exit of native workers from labor markets
experiencing an influx of immigrant workers? Consider this discussion
of the evidence on changing migration patterns, both internal and
external:
A century ago immigrants went to high-wage cities, while natives often
remained in low-wage rural areas. Today, . . . immigrants go where their coethnics are, while American-born migrants go where wages are highest. . . .
If unskilled Americans respond to large-scale immigration by moving
elsewhere, analyzing wage changes in the cities or states where immigrants
settle cannot tell us how immigration affects wages. . . . [Borjas] estimates that
almost half [the large increase in the wage gap between high school dropouts
and graduates] was caused by the fact that American-born high school dropouts
faced more competition from immigrants than any other group of Americanborn workers. Whether immigration contributed to the growth of inequality
among better-educated workers remains an unexplored question.55

The validity of Brimelow’s third consequentialist claim—that immigration
is a net “drain on the economy”—depends not only on the answers to
labor market questions such as these, but also on immigrants’ use of
public services, their tax payments, and their effects on prices and
productivity. The extent of immigrants’ receipt of welfare, Social
Security Income, food stamps, and other public assistance also depends
on methodological choices; refugees, for example, are relatively welfaredependent, and some states have much more generous programs than
others. To compare immigrants’ utilization with that of natives, one
must carefully specify the control variables, especially health, income,
skill, and family structure factors.

55.
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Attempting to take into account all of these economic factors, a
National Research Council report published in 1997 concluded that
immigration makes Americans as a whole slightly wealthier.56 As
Christopher Jencks summarizes this finding: “The big effects of
immigration are on the distribution of income. Under America’s current
immigration policy, the winners are employers who get cheaper labor,
skilled workers who pay less for their burgers and nannies, and immigrants
themselves. The losers are unskilled American-born workers.”57 The
fact that assessing this tradeoff—between increased wealth and the
regressive distributional effects—is not an empirical question but a
normative one illustrates an important fact about the immigration debate:
Even as moral arguments tend to devolve into consequentialist ones,
consequentialist ones can also devolve into moral ones.
C. Cultural Assimilation
Brimelow suggests that the post-1965 immigrants bear, and presumably
transmit to their children, different and less attractive values than did the
earlier waves of immigrants.58 Although he is a bit vague about the
indicia of the decline in immigrants’ moral and cultural values, he does
mention three areas of particular concern: crime, limited English
proficiency (particularly among Hispanics), and high illegitimacy rates
(particularly among Mexican immigrants and Mexican-Americans). Each
of these areas is certainly worth worrying about, and they do rest on
empirical claims.
Crimes committed by aliens drive much public hostility to immigration.59
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports in 2005 suggest the
magnitude of the problem.60 The number of aliens incarcerated in federal
56. THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF
IMMIGRATION 4, 5–6 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997).
57. Jencks, supra note 37, at 63.
58. BRIMELOW, supra note 44, at 5. For another argument that American identity
is threatened by Hispanic immigration, see SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE
CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY ch. 9 (2004). Huntington’s claim has in
turn been challenged empirically. See, e.g., Jack Citrin et al., Testing Huntington: Is
Hispanic Immigration a Threat to American Identity?, in 5 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 31
(2007).
59. This paragraph and the one following are taken from my chapter in Peter H.
Schuck, Immigration, in UNDERSTANDING AMERICA: THE ANATOMY OF AN EXCEPTIONAL
NATION 341, 362–63 (Peter H. Schuck & James Q. Wilson eds., 2008).
60. RICHARD M. STANA, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION
ON CRIMINAL ALIENS INCARCERATED IN FEDERAL AND STATE PRISONS AND LOCAL JAILS
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facilities increased from about 42,000 in 2001 to about 49,000 in 2004, a
15% increase. Aliens are about 27% of all federal prisoners, accounting
for approximately $1.2 billion in federal costs in 2004. In a study of
more than 55,000 illegal aliens in federal prisons, the GAO found that
the average one had about eight arrests (for thirteen offenses); 26% of
them had eleven or more arrests. About 45% of the offenses committed
by this population were for drug or immigration crimes, but 12% were
for violent crimes such as murder, robbery, assault, and sex-related
crimes, and 15% were for property-related crimes. These statistics, of
course, do not include the very large number of aliens in state prisons
and local jails. In California, more than 20% of the inmates during the
mid-1990s were thought to be foreign-born, with roughly the same share
in Los Angeles County jails.61
These statistics reflect the high levels of immigration in recent years,
but they do not mean that immigrants are more prone to crime. In fact,
incarceration rates for foreign-born men aged eighteen to thirty-nine are
much lower than for native-born men (in 2000, 0.7% versus 3.5%);
moreover, this difference has increased substantially since 1990. Indeed,
if we exclude island-born Puerto Ricans, who have far higher crime rates
but are citizens, the foreign-born rate is even lower and the difference
correspondingly greater. The crime problem arises chiefly in the second
generation; the incarceration rates of the U.S.-born children of immigrants
are higher than those of both their parents and of non-Hispanic white
citizens, and their incarceration rates generally increase the longer they
are in the country.62 Strikingly, these patterns hold even controlling for
age, education, race or ethnicity, and citizenship.63
On English language proficiency, the evidence is mixed but generally
encouraging, as market pressures, schooling in the United States, and the
surrounding Anglophone culture do their work.64 Most studies find that
the immigrant generation acquires fluency at roughly the same rate as
(2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05337r.pdf; RICHARD M. STANA, U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION ON CERTAIN ILLEGAL ALIENS ARRESTED IN THE
UNITED STATES (2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05646r.pdf.
61. Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and
Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 376–82 (1999).
62. See Ruben G. Rumbaut et al., Debunking the Myth of Immigrant Criminality:
Imprisonment Among First- and Second-Generation Young Men, June 1, 2006, http://
contact.migrationpolicy.org/site/R?i=vhS06zFz8ttwehKjdrEprA. Indeed, immigration may
be a major cause of the declining homicide rates since 1990. Robert J. Sampson, Open
Doors Don’t Invite Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at A15.
63. E-mail from Kristin F. Butcher, Associate Professor of Economics, Wellesley
College, to Peter H. Schuck, Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law, Yale University
(Mar. 6, 2006) (on file with author).
64. BARRY R. CHISWICK & PAUL W. MILLER, THE ECONOMICS OF LANGUAGE:
INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES 39 (2007).
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earlier waves did, that the one-and-a-half generation, immigrants’
foreign-born children who arrive at a young age, learn it at school and
strongly prefer it to their parents’ native language, that virtually all of
the second generation speak it proficiently by the end of high school,
and that the third generation is largely monolingual in English and likes
it that way.65 But this optimistic picture is marred by the estimated 3
million or more U.S.-born students with Limited English Proficiency
(LEP), despite—or because of—bilingual education programs.66 Among
the native-born who speak another language at home, earnings are lower
than among monolingual native-born English speakers, presumably
because of their limited proficiency in English.67 Indeed, 10% of LEP
students are third-generation Americans, and the 1990 Census found that
almost 8 million households, 8.3% of the United States total, were
linguistically isolated, meaning that no person age fourteen or older
spoke English well.68
The rates of interethnic marriage—a strong sign, as well as a contributing
cause, of cultural integration—are very high, particularly marriages
between Asian women and Hispanic and white males, and the residential
integration of those groups into white-majority urban and suburban
communities is growing rapidly.69 Also important to the integration of
immigrants are the allure and ethnic diversity of a powerful mass media
and popular culture, including minority-dominated sports teams, and the
receptiveness of America’s religious communities to newcomers who in
turn are reinvigorating and often transforming these communities.
Recent studies of assimilation patterns over time suggest that the most
recent immigrants are assimilating as quickly as those of earlier decades,
65.
66.

Id.
PETER SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE
DISTANCE 110 (2003).
67. CHISWICK & MILLER, supra note 64, at 416–21. According to Chiswick, “The
characteristics of those immigrants (and presumably their children) who lag behind in
English are interesting—recent migrants low education, migrated at an older age,
sojourners (move back & forth), intend to stay a short period of time, come from
countries a shorter distance from the U.S., able to avoid using English (live in linguistic
concentration area, access to origin language media) and origin language linguistically
distant from English. Hence, we see those of Hispanic origin lagging behind as they are
more likely to have characteristics associated with low proficiency.” E-mail from Barry
R. Chiswick, UIC Distinguished Professor of Economics, University of Illinois at
Chicago, to Peter H. Schuck, Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law, Yale University
(Oct. 10, 2008, 23:11 EST) (on file with author).
68. SCHUCK, supra note 66, at 110 n.159.
69. Id. at 208 nn.25–26.
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although perhaps more slowly than those of a century ago.70 Although
this swift and steady pace of assimilation is generally desirable, one aspect
of it has a darker side. In a process that sociologists of immigration
call downward or segmented assimilation, very young immigrants and
the young children of immigrants often adopt norms and conduct—gang
membership and violence, rejection of parental and other authority,
scorn for academic achievement, “gangsta” talk, and the like—all too
common and dysfunctional in the United States, that may impede their
future mobility and integration.71 Among at least some immigrant groups,
such as the Vietnamese, the best academic achievers are usually those
who assimilate more slowly to American culture, while the delinquent
youngsters are quicker to abandon their ethnic heritage.72
III. NATIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH
In my view, the overall growth of our economy—its production of
goods and services—is the single most important goal of a rational and
morally-justified immigration policy. This is emphatically not to say
that it is the only legitimate goal, nor is it to deny the moral imperative
of a generous level of humanitarian admissions, mainly refugees and
asylees, who among all the legal immigration categories generally
possess the lowest economic skills.73 But it is to say that economic
growth engenders immense social value in many forms: higher standard
of living; accumulation of skills, education, and other kinds of human
capital; social optimism; technological advancement; philanthropy; and
many more. This social value, moreover, tends to be widely distributed
across the American population, and has the added virtue of also
enriching immigrants’ communities of origin abroad through financial
remittances, technology transfers, and other valuable social developmental
processes.74

70. JACOB L. VIGDOR, CENTER FOR CIVIC INNOVATION MANHATTAN INSTITUTE,
CIVIC REPORT NO. 53, MEASURING IMMIGRANT ASSIMILATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(2008), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_53.pdf. Different ethnic groups, however,
are assimilating at varying rates. PHILIP KASINITZ ET AL., INHERITING THE CITY: THE
CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS COME OF AGE (2008).
71. See generally ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBEN G. RUMBAUT, LEGACIES: THE
STORY OF THE IMMIGRANT SECOND GENERATION (2001); MARY C. WATERS, BLACK
IDENTITIES: WEST INDIAN IMMIGRANT DREAMS AND AMERICAN REALITIES (1999).
72. PORTES & RUMBAUT, supra note 71, at 1–15.
73. BORJAS, supra note 53, at ch. 5.
74. See M ICHAEL J. T REBILCOCK & R OBERT HOWSE , T HE R EGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 618 (3d. ed. 2005) (estimating $105.2 billion in remittances in
1999, $65.3 billion of which is to developing countries). It may well be that, all things
considered, these remittances are generally a more effective form of foreign aid than
government-to-government programs.
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Economic growth is also socially desirable because by enlarging the
pie, it increases the attractiveness and public acceptance of what may
fairly be called “noneconomic” goods or values. A wealthier society, for
example, is more likely to support increased environmental protection,
occupational safety, education for the poor, civil rights for the disabled
and other minorities, cultural activity, refugee protection, philanthropy,
tolerance for dissent and diversity, and many other social goals that, while
often conducive to economic growth, are best justified in noneconomic
terms.75 In addition, a wealthier society is likely to feel less threatened by
immigration and thus be more receptive to newcomers, and perhaps to
support increased levels of immigration.76 In fact, an important part of
any explanation of the expansiveness of our immigration policy in recent
decades must be American society’s growing awareness and valuation of
these noneconomic goods.77 These attitudinal changes in turn reflect the
immense economic and educational gains achieved in the United States
during this period.78
Current U.S. immigration policy gives enormous—and probably
excessive, as I shall suggest—weight to the noneconomic goods flowing
from economic growth. As noted earlier, almost two-thirds of the more
than one million legal admissions in 2007 were based not on skills or
economic potential but solely on the immigrant’s family relationships
with U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents. Another 13% were refugees,
asylees, and other humanitarian admissions, and 6% were based on
diversity and other noneconomic factors.79 Only 15.4% were accepted
in the employment-based categories—which include visa-qualifying
investors. Even this 15.4% share exaggerates the weight of economic
factors in our current green card allocation system. Most members of
this group were admitted not because of their own economic value but
75. For development of this argument, see AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR
SAFETY 59–75 (1988). But see REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 33, at 67–76 (disputing
Wildavsky’s claim).
76. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 33, at 67–76.
77. This is not to say, however, that the American public fully understands the
extent to which immigration may be responsible for the increase in these goods. See
generally Peter H. Schuck, The Disconnect Between Public Attitudes and Policy
Outcomes in Immigration, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 17, 30–31 (Carol M. Swain ed.,
2007).
78. For documentation of these gains, see Benjamin M. Friedman, The Economic
System, in UNDERSTANDING AMERICA, supra note 59, at 87, 94, 100, and Paul E.
Peterson, Education, in UNDERSTANDING AMERICA, supra note 59, at 411, 433.
79. JEFFERYS & MONGER, supra note 17, at 3 tbl.2.

887

SCHUCK.PRINTER.DOC

11/25/2008 2:02:02 PM

solely because they were spouses or minor children accompanying a
skills-based immigrant. 80 To be sure, some of these accompanying
family members will work productively in the United States, and their
mere presence and familial support will presumably increase the main
worker’s productivity. But these possibilities are irrelevant to their
admission.
In short, noneconomic considerations utterly dwarf economic ones in
the current allocation of permanent immigration visas.81 Strikingly and
perhaps ironically, other major immigrant-receiving countries accord much
more importance to economic factors than the comparatively marketoriented United States does. Canada, for example, admits approximately
half of its immigrants under a point system that emphasizes economic
productivity potential.82 Australia employs a similar system,83 and the
United Kingdom began its own in 2008.84 To the extent that the United
States’ privileging of noneconomic factors actually reduces economic
growth—humanitarian admissions aside—it is out of proper balance and
should be reconsidered. I do so in Part IV.
While emphasizing the value of immigration-related economic growth,
however, I do not suggest that it is either an unalloyed good or an
uncontroversial one. First, it does not necessarily, or perhaps even
usually, make everyone in the society better off. Few if any significant
policy changes are Pareto optimal in this sense, entailing no losers.
Even free trade enthusiasts, for example, should concede that such
changes will almost always produce a smaller slice of the pie for some
people—for example, those who lose their jobs due to imports and
cannot find equally good work thereafter—and that those people are
most likely to be the ones who are already highly vulnerable to welfare
80. Specifically, for fiscal year 2007, the number of employment-based permanent
admissions who were dependents was 89,300, or 55.1% of the total. E-mail from Nancy
Rytina, Deputy Director, Office of Immigration Statistics/Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., to Peter H. Schuck, Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law, Yale Law School (Apr.
14, 2008) (on file with author).
81. Economic factors do loom larger in the granting of “nonimmigrant” visas for
many different categories of temporary visitors. Of the more than 33 million temporary
(“nonimmigrant”) visas issued in 2006, 20.1% were based on labor market skills. OFFICE
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TEMPORARY ADMISSIONS OF
NONIMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES: 2006, ANNUAL FLOW REPORT (2007), http://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/NI_FR_2006_508_final.pdf. Moreover,
the in-country expenditures by tourists and other temporary visitors clearly add to the
national economy.
82. See, e.g., Christopher Mason & Julia Preston, Canada’s Policy on Immigrants
Brings Backlog, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2007, at A1.
83. Australia Immigration, http://www.workpermit.com/australia/australianimmigration.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).
84. HomeOffice.gov.uk, New Points-Based Immigration System Starts Next Year
(Apr. 18, 2007), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/news/points-based-system.
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losses. In the case of new immigration, the most likely losers are lowskilled American workers and other immigrant workers.
Second, in thinking about immigration’s effects, we must recognize
the fact that, as Max Frisch famously observed about post-war Europe’s
demand for foreign labor, “We asked for workers but human beings
came.”85 Once here, immigrants cannot be treated as if they were simply
wealth-creating machines that can be discarded as soon as they have
exhausted their economic value. Similarly, a policy causing adverse
effects to American workers is more troubling than one causing adverse
effects on goods—and this is true, as a political matter if not a moral
one, even if free trade in goods has similar or even identical economic
effects in terms of reducing jobs for our workers. In the case of native
workers displaced by foreign ones, those displacement effects tend to be
more direct and visible to the rest of society than in the case of trade
policies that disadvantage competing American goods and hence the
workers who produce them. In both cases, this causal opacity can serve
the purposes of politicians and policymakers who hope to obscure the
identity of the groups and individuals who will bear most of the costs of
worker-displacing policies that the politicians and policymakers support.86
This same opacity, for perhaps more psychological reasons, may also
comfort ordinary citizens who would rather not know that there are costbearers, much less who they are.
A third reason why immigration’s contributions to economic growth
are controversial is that conventional macroeconomic measures of
growth do not usually take account of its negative externalities, such as
production-related pollution and congestion costs for which the producers
are not charged. These and other externalities reduce pro tanto our
otherwise growth-enhanced quality of life.
Fourth, there is the much disputed empirical question of how large the
economic effects of immigration actually are—setting to one side the
questions of how these effects are and should be distributed. The most
authoritative study of this question, published by the National Academy
of Sciences’ National Research Council in 1997, found economic benefits

85. This phrase is quoted in James F. Hollifield, The Politics of International
Migration: How Can We “Bring the State Back In?”, in MIGRATION THEORY: TALKING
ACROSS DISCIPLINES 183, 196 (Caroline B. Brettell & James F. Hollifield eds., 2d ed.
2008).
86. Indeed, the ability to throw up this kind of causal fog is a valuable skill for all
political entrepreneurs.
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of up to $10 billion a year.87 This is a large number, but it amounts to
only a tiny fraction of the almost $14 trillion (in 2007) American
economy.88 Perhaps needless to say, there are numerous ways to
challenge this $10 billion figure, in both directions. For present purposes,
what matters most is the relative weight to be given to economic
growth in fashioning immigration policy. I do not know precisely what
that weight should be; my claim is only that it should be greater than it
is.
Finally, however one resolves these definitional, methodological, and
empirical questions about immigration’s effects on economic growth, a
deep and vexing normative question of distributive justice will remain—
even for a steadfast consequentialist assessor of immigration policy:
Why should she count only immigration’s effects on Americans, without
taking account of its effects, for both good and ill, on the much larger
number of people in the rest of the world? As a factual matter, it seems
clear that most Americans much prefer the welfare of their fellow
citizens and permanent residents to the welfare of outsiders. Supporting
this positive claim is a positive fact: Congress directs only a tiny and
declining percentage of U.S. government revenues to foreign aid.89
This proposition, of course, speaks only to what popular attitudes are,
not what they should be under some normative theory. Cosmopolitan
communitarians and post-national moralists are likely to regard this
strong preference for one’s own as selfish, parochial, arbitrary, and
unjust. Others, however, will view it as self-evidently justified, indeed,
as logically implied by the very nature of a common nationhood. They
may acknowledge a moral duty of benevolence to outsiders but feel that
this duty is best discharged through some combination of foreign aid,
private remittances, and private philanthropy.
I shall not seek to resolve these moral, and empirical, perplexities. For
my mainly consequentialist purposes here, the point is that the difficulty
of authoritatively resolving them helps to explain why one might argue,
without obvious inconsistency, (1) that we should allocate a larger share
87. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC,
FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 1, 6, 153, 220 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston
eds., 1997).
88. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Economic Accounts, Current Dollar
and “Real” GDP, http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).
89. Two points about this fact are worth making. First, Americans may limit
foreign aid not because they care less about foreigners than about their countrymen—
although I think they do—but because they believe that such aid is ineffective in helping
foreigners due to corruption, perverse incentives, or other reasons. Second, Americans
engage in an immense amount of private philanthropy, much of which goes to foreigners. See
Arthur C. Brooks, Philanthropy and the Non-Profit Sector, in UNDERSTANDING AMERICA,
supra note 59, at 539, 542–43.
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of our annual immigrant admissions to those immigrants who are most
likely to enhance national wealth, (2) that our immigration policy should
also promote some of the noneconomic values discussed earlier, whether
those values are held for deontological or instrumental reasons, and (3)
that some zero-sum trade-off between these economic and noneconomic
goals is likely to exist at any given level of admissions.
IV. INCREASING IMMIGRATION-RELATED ECONOMIC GROWTH
If we wished to increase the role of national economic self-interest
in immigration policy, how might we do so? For present purposes of
illustration and provocation, I shall briefly discuss five possible reforms
here: (1) increase the number of temporary and permanent employmentrelated visas; (2) auction off those visas; (3) allow U.S. citizens and legal
residents to bid for priority processing of amnesty for specific undocumented
aliens; (4) encourage private participation in enforcement; and (5) raise
visa processing fees. Needless to say, even to advance any serious
proposals along these lines—not to mention effectively defending
them—would require far greater detail and attention to possible objections
than I can provide here. I discuss them here without necessarily endorsing
them.
A. Increasing Employment-Related Visas
From a purely economic point of view, the optimal immigration policy
would grant visas to all foreign workers whose production value is likely
to exceed the social costs of their presence here.90 So long as
immigrants remain ineligible for social welfare benefits, an important
and controversial issue not pursued here, the principal costs would
include congestion, environmental burdens, higher prices resulting from
additional demand, and immigration-induced unemployment or reduced
wage effects on American workers—or on other immigrants, as the
discussion of the empirical data in Part II strongly suggests.
The precise wage and unemployment effects of immigration on
workers in the United States are of course highly controversial among
labor economists, and I am in no position to resolve them. For present

90. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Migration as International Trade: The Economic
Gains from the Liberalized Movement of Labor, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
371, 379–90 (1998).
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purposes, and vastly simplifying the analysis, I make two points. First,
even assuming such adverse effects on American workers, the optimally
efficient immigration policy is to import more cost-effective workers—
as just defined—and then use the fruits of the resulting efficiency gains
to retrain or otherwise compensate the disadvantaged U.S. workers. Not
surprisingly, this position mirrors the logic of free trade in goods and
services. Second, although market efficiency is not—and should not
be—the sole immigration policy goal and must therefore be traded off
against other policy goals, economic growth is nevertheless highlyvalued in American society, which makes a strong case for giving
employment-based visas a significantly larger share of the total and
family-based visas a correspondingly lower share. As noted earlier, the
easiest way to accomplish this politically is to enlarge the total number
of visas, thus easing the zero-sum competition with family-based visas.
Another way, prominent in the systems of other immigrant-receiving
countries, as noted earlier, is to adopt a point system in which
characteristics associated with high economic potential are given great
weight. Such a system has received some bipartisan support in Congress
but has not yet been enacted.91
B. Auctioning Visas
A visa to the United States is the most valuable resource that mobile
foreigners can ever hope to obtain—the right to permanent residence,
citizenship, and further family migration here. Receiving a family-based
or employment-based visa is a huge emotional or economic windfall, or
both, to those who receive it. This is true, moreover, regardless of the
immigrant’s individual merit and regardless of the fact that the
immigrant’s receipt of the visa is also valuable to those family members
or employers in the United States who petitioned for it. As Gary Becker,
Julian Simon, and some other economists have proposed, the most
straightforward, non-discretionary way to determine (1) which aliens
would benefit most from the visas in the United States, and (2) which of
them would be valued most highly by the people in the United States
who want them here, is to auction off the visas to the highest bidder
meeting the legally-specified eligibility requirements.92 The current

91. See S. 1639, 110th Cong. § 502 (2007).
92. See JULIAN SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 307
(1989); Alan O. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical
Survey with an Analysis of U.S. Policy, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION, supra note 2, at 158,
181–83; Gary S. Becker, An Open Door for Immigrants: The Auction, WALL ST. J., Oct.
14, 1992, at A14.
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system eschews such targeting criteria in favor of very crude categories,
which are administered in a notoriously inept fashion.93
No convincing conception of justice demands that this precious
windfall should be distributed, as under the current system, to eligible
aliens on a first-come, first-served basis rather than by willingness to pay
for it at an auction—I will discuss the ability-to-pay consideration in a
moment. Still less is there any justification for distributing 50,000 of
these valuable visas by lottery, which is how the so-called “diversity”
visa program works.94 No other country allocates its visas by lottery.95
Instead, those relatively few countries that accept permanent immigrants
distribute their visas on the basis of national interest criteria, usually
economic or ethnic. I put humanitarian admissions to one side here.
Suppose, then, that the government decided to auction off some subset
of its visa quotas to the highest eligible bidder. The most compelling
case for this approach clearly is employment-based visas, where the
would-be employer now petitions, at significant cost, to import certain
workers who possess or can readily acquire the skills needed by the firm.
The government would specify the criteria that bidders, for example
firms that wish to employ immigrants, or perhaps the immigrants themselves,
must satisfy in terms of job skills, language competency, years spent on
a visa waiting list, or other desiderata, and then allow all eligibles to bid
for the available visas—subject, of course, to the usual grounds of
excludability applicable to all intending immigrants. In an auction, the
enormous surplus value of a visa—its value in excess of the bidder’s
opportunity cost—would be captured not by the immigrant but by the
government, which could then use the surplus to upgrade American
workers’ job skills or for other social purposes. It seems likely that these
visas would be won by the most productive workers whose labor most
helps the U.S. economy, as they would find it easiest to finance their
bids. These arguments, moreover, are by no means confined to allocating
permanent employment-based visas. Indeed, an auction might be even
93. In the case of employment-based visas, organized labor and other interests
have rendered the required labor certification process notoriously bureaucratic, inefficient,
costly, and slow in order to obstruct the hiring of foreign workers. This process, which
forces time-sensitive employers to try to circumvent the system, now burdens both
immigrant and American workers, consumers, and the economy.
94. I have discussed the absurdity and maladministration of this program in
SCHUCK, supra note 66, at 123–31, where I urge that it be abolished and the 50,000 visas
be redistributed among the other visa categories.
95. Id. at 128.
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more desirable for temporary work visas, where time is of the essence
and the number of visas has been severely limited.96
To address ability-to-pay constraints or other fairness concerns, the
government might subsidize or partly finance the bids of productive
workers who for good reasons cannot fully finance their own. Moreover,
fairness concerns must answer the compared with what question. One
must compare any perceived unfairness of this auction scheme with the
existing system, which favors workers who are in the United States
already, often illegally, and who can get employer sponsors and lawyers
to navigate the immigration and labor bureaucracies on their behalf. If
the auctioned visas were added to the existing ones, no one in line would
be worse off and those who have been waiting for visas might be better
off.
Any auction proposal, of course, will face strong political and
ideological objections. Opponents will disparage it as allowing people
to buy their way into the United States, which is thought to be anathema
to our traditions, and to do so when close family members of U.S.
residents must wait for years to rejoin them here. Proponents would
respond by pointing to the investor visa program, which already allows
people to obtain visas by agreeing to create new jobs in the United
States, and by explaining how the existing system actually operates
much more unfairly than appears on paper. These defenses of an auction,
however, are unlikely to assuage public misgivings—and perhaps they
should not. Miss Liberty holding aloft an auctioneer’s gavel rather than
holding a torch of liberty would be a less inspiring icon.
C. Auctioning Certain Amnesties
Elsewhere, I have advocated a generous amnesty—or earned legalization,
if you prefer, for most of the roughly 12 million undocumented aliens in
the United States today.97 I—and many other amnesty proponents—
base this case on a combination of economic, fairness, and pragmatic
considerations. Assuming that some form of amnesty is desirable public
policy, many issues of eligibility and administration must be resolved.
For present purposes, I want to bypass these issues and focus on the
question of how we should select or prioritize candidates for amnesty
who are eligible.

96. See Julia Preston, Many Visas Are Sought for Skilled, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,
2008, at A18 (noting that employers filed 163,000 H-1B petitions in the first five days
when petitions could be filed, more than twice as many as can be granted during the
entire fiscal year 2009).
97. Peter H. Schuck, Bordering on Folly, AM. LAW., Oct. 2007, at 83, 84.

894

SCHUCK.PRINTER.DOC

11/25/2008 2:02:02 PM

[VOL. 45: 865, 2008]

The Morality of Immigration Policy
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

As with visa processing, an auction could help to determine which
applications the government will process first. Suitable safeguards for
anonymity, which were a feature of earlier amnesties, are necessary lest
fear of detection discourage applications. In the vast majority of cases, I
suppose, the applicants who most deserve amnesty will be those whose
labor in the United States is most valuable, whose removal would thus
be most costly to their American employers, and whose employers
should therefore be expected to bid the most for the right to retain them.
These economic factors likely correlate, more or less strongly, with certain
other factors—the duration of their illegal stay in the United States, their
English proficiency, their compliance with the (non-immigration) laws, and
their ties to family and friends here—that amnesty programs have
directly or indirectly taken into account. In addition, the size of their
bids should roughly reflect these same factors.
Again, those seeking amnesty, like those seeking employment-based
visas, will vary in their financial resources and thus in their ability to bid.
But here too, those whose employers, family members, and community
organizations are most anxious for them to gain amnesty will help to
support their bids—and their eagerness to do so would itself signal the
applicant’s desirability. Although this would place the less well-connected
of the undocumented at a relative disadvantage, recall that I am proposing
this merely as a prioritization technique, not as the exclusive method
for obtaining amnesty.
D. Private Participation in Enforcement
The persistent failures of federal immigration enforcement are
well-documented.98 The most serious of these failures are its chronic
ineffectiveness in apprehending illegal entrants at the border and visa
abusers in the interior, its inability to reduce the very high absconding
rate by aliens whom the government does not detain pending removal
proceedings or pending actual removal, and the large number of criminal
aliens in government custody or under criminal justice system supervision
who are not promptly removed from the United States. Because so little
progress has been made in these areas despite large infusions of budget,
new personnel, and legal authority, I conclude that the problem is more
98. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Law and the Study of Migration, in MIGRATION
THEORY: TALKING ACROSS DISCIPLINES, supra note 85, at 239, 246–50; Schuck &
Williams, supra note 61, at 399.
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or less endemic. Some underenforcement is surely optimal.99 But
whichever level of effective immigration enforcement the federal
government actually targets, it seems manifestly unable or unwilling to
provide it.
There is good reason, then, to consider ways to augment federal
enforcement with resources drawn from other quarters. There are two
possibilities. I have argued elsewhere for greater state and local involvement
in immigration enforcement.100 I have also urged serious consideration
of a larger role for private profit-motivated agencies in monitoring,
identifying, and pursuing removable aliens.101 Jeffrey Manns, drawing
on the theoretical law-and-economics literature on gatekeepers, has
developed this idea in imaginative detail.102 He gives special attention to
marshalling private incentives to implement employer sanctions, a
program that is inevitably central to immigration enforcement but one
that has been notoriously ineffective.103
E. Raise Visa Processing Fees
The logic of this approach is similar to that of the auctions and so
requires little additional discussion. Although some visa processing fees
were raised recently, they do not begin to cover the costs of visa
administration. Since it is the immigrant who receives by far the greatest
economic and other benefits from obtaining a visa, the processing fee
should cover a larger proportion of that value, which would also enable
the government to hire more staff and reduce backlogs for visas,
naturalization, and other immigrant services. There is always political
resistance to raising the fees, mainly on the ground that some
immigrants cannot afford it. But as between the immigrant who reaps a
vast windfall from the visa, and the taxpayer who benefits only
indirectly and slightly, both economic principle and common morality
dictate that the immigrant should bear most, if not all, of the cost.
Provision for fee waivers in unusual hardship cases can be made.

99. Schuck, Law and the Study of Migration, in MIGRATION THEORY: TALKING
ACROSS DISCIPLINES, supra note 85, at 249–50.
100. See Schuck & Williams, supra note 61, at 458–60; see also Peter H. Schuck,
Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 71–77.
101. Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A White Paper, 11 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 682 (1997).
102. Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration
Enforcement, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 946.
103. On the ineffectiveness of employer sanctions, see also Schuck, supra note 97,
at 83.
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V. CONCLUSION
Any rigorous moralizing about immigration must ultimately grapple—
among other things—with its empirical consequences. The analysis in
Parts II and III indicates that although our understanding of those
consequences is growing, our ignorance remains vast. Until that halcyon
day when social scientists can dispel this ignorance—and perhaps even
then—the nation’s economic growth will constitute a major social goal
and our immigration policy will be a very important means for achieving
it.104 That being so, we are well-advised to consider, as Part IV has
sought to do, ways in which economic incentives can be used to make
immigration policy a more effective instrument in advancing that goal
without unduly sacrificing others. It certainly is not the only goal worth
pursuing, but it is probably the one on whose specific meanings and
general desirability a diverse nation can most readily agree.

104. This Article was written before the global economic crisis struck in the
summer and fall of 2008. This crisis, of course, only increases each society’s stakes in
using immigration policy to enhance economic growth, subject to the other goals and
constraints discussed above.
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